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York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958.

THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND,

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNA-

by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht. New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1958.

TIONAL COURT,

The ideal of a world rule of law has fundamentally influenced
the development of modern international law. On the one hand,
this ideal has focused attention on the integrative factor in international relations, and, to this extent at least, has held out the
hope that conflicts between nations could be settled by peaceful
means. On the other hand, however, it has been unfortunate
that this ideal has led to a serious distortion of the role of law
in international relations. There has been a tendency on the
part of many concerned with international law to turn what is
essentially an aspiration into a rather rigid framework for the
interpretation of international relations in general. The effect
of this over conceptualization has been an artificial separation
of international law from its social setting. The reality of a
"world rule of law" remains essentially in the realm of aspiration, a goal to be striven for, but hardly a prescription for contemporary international problems. To prescribe legal principles
and procedures to a world fundamentally divided along political
and ideological lines is at best an idle intellectual exercise, and,
when prescribed as policy, a misleading if not dangerous occupation. We still live in a world where the big issues that divide
nations are not reducible to legal terms and, therefore, not
amenable to legal resolution. The ultimate test of any legal order
is its ability to resolve the big issues of its society. It is on this
point where international law has failed to maintain world peace
in the past and where any postulated "world rule of law" is bound
to fail in our time.
It is with a sense of trepidation, therefore, that one approaches the growing belief in the United States in a "world
rule of law" as a solution to the problem of peace. This renewed
interest in a "world rule of law" has received special impetus
from a statement by President Eisenhower in his State of the
Union message in January 1959, in which he declared that it
was the intention of the United States Government to "intensify
efforts . . .to the end that the rule of law replace the obsolete
rule of force in the affairs of nations." This intention was reaffirmed by Vice-President Nixon in an address before the
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Academy of Political Science on April 13, 1959. Congress is now
considering a less qualified participation in the International
Court of Justice. On the academic level, a World Rule of Law
Center has been established at Duke University to investigate
the possibilities of such an order. The American Bar Association
has set up a Special Committee on World Peace Through World
Law for the same purpose. What is in prospect, it would seem,
is a great revival of interest in the areas of comparative law,
to uncover the many similarities of legal principle and practice
among the nations of the world; of international organization,
to study and devise international institutions; and international
law, to elucidate the law as it exists, and if the past is any
criterion, to dwell overly long on what it ought to be. This, of
course, excludes the immense possibilities offered to the behavioral sciences. It can only be hoped that one of the more
important by-products of this activity will be a clearer understanding of the limitations of law in contemporary international
relations.
Since much of the work being done on behalf of a world rule
of law takes the form of unlimited prescription, it is a refreshing experience to read those works that attack the subject with
a full sense of the limiting factors involved. C. Wilfred Jenks'
The Common Law of Mankind and Sir Hersch Lauterpacht's The
Development of International Law by the International Court
have this virtue. These two works deal with matters vital to
the ideal of a world rule of law and both optimistically see in
their respective studies the development of a more effective international legal order. There are firm grounds, however, for
questioning some of the optimistic assumptions made by the
authors.
The thesis of Jenks' work is that postwar international relations presents for the first time in the history of the modern
state system a true basis for a world common law. "Contemporary international law," the author states, "can no longer be
reasonably presented in the framework of the classical exposition
of international law as the law governing the relations between
states, but must be regarded as the common law of mankind in
an early stage of development." There are three general factors
cited by the author that make this reappraisal necessary. The
first is the vastly increased content of international law which
must now include the public and private "law of economic and
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technological interdependence," the "law governing the structure
and law making processes of the international community," the
international law of human rights, and rules regulating the conflict of laws. Secondly, international law has ceased to be a
European centered system and now includes the whole politically
organized world. For the first time, the author states, "we have
the formal framework of a universal world order and the formal
elements of a universal legal order." The formal elements contributing to a universal legal order spring from a "sufficient
consensus of general principle" of all the world's legal systems,
including those of the communist nations, and from certain
emerging and established principles and practices that are receiving greater acceptance by all nations. Among the latter the
author points to the breakdown of the traditional concept of
sovereignty, the greater acceptance of the principle of third
party judgment, the rational limits placed on the principle of
self help imposed by modern weapons, the principle of pacta sunt
servanda, the emerging principle of national liability for damage
incurred as a result of state policy, and the universal recognition
of basic human rights. In the third place, the author cites the
impact of international organizations on the development of
international law. This is true not only with respect to the increased effectiveness of the legislative, judicial, and enforcement
functions of the United Nations but also, and more importantly,
the growth of the operational activities of international social
and economic organizations. All these factors, the author contends, offer a substantial basis for the development of a world
common law.
The emphasis placed by the author upon the uniqueness of
postwar international relations with respect to the opportunities
that exist for the development of a more effective international
law is open to question. There is a tendency on the part of those
concerned with a "world rule of law" to equate novelty with
uniqueness and what is contingent with essential change. While
it is possible to postulate tendencies toward a more integrated
international society and a more effective international legal
order, the opposite tendencies can also be observed; that is,
toward a more intensely divided "world society" and greater uncertainty with respect to the law. The uniqueness ascribed to
the extension of international law from its Western European
base to a legal system including the social and cultural diversity
of the whole world represents more than anything else a quanti-
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tative extension of the state system which does not necessarily
imply any essential change in the existing legal order. The
aroused nationalisms of the underdeveloped nations and the cold
war itself cannot be viewed as a movement toward greater international integration.
Another unique factor referred to by the author is that of
economic interdependence fostered by economic development programs of various kinds. It must be pointed out in the first place
that the international economic relationships that existed prior
to the political independence of former colonial areas have remained essentially intact; that is, these areas remain exporters
of primary goods and importers of manufactured goods. The
independence of these areas, however, has imposed national bargaining agents in the trading process where none had previously
existed. Thus in the overall structural sense the postwar international economy is not a more but a less integrated trading
order. Secondly, the drive for economic development by the
underdeveloped nations is toward industrialization and greater
economic independence from the more industrially advanced
countries. While international cooperation for economic development may be presently productive of closer economic ties, the
goal is greater independence for the underdeveloped state.
Finally, economic aid has become one of the major weapons of
the cold war and, therefore, can hardly be emphasized as an
integrative factor in international relations.
The final observation to be made here concerns the frequently
asserted assumption that modern weapons have placed a rational
limitation on the principle of self-help. The existence of nuclear
weapons acts only as a deterrent to an all out war. They do not
preclude this eventuality and they have not prevented recourse
to arms, as witness the number of small wars that have been
fought since the development of.the atomic bomb. The point to
be made here is that the rational deterrent presented by nuclear
weapons does not imply a more peaceful international order.
What it does imply, and what has proven to be the case thus
far, is that the means of advancing the interests of a nuclear
state has been reduced from the maximum power at their disposal to less costly alternatives. The weapons of the cold war
are those of propaganda, economic penetration, and political
subversion. While these means are less warlike, they are no less
hostile in intent. The so-called rights of self-defense and self-
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help have been limited only to the extent that total war is to be
avoided. The deterrent force of nuclear weapons does not apply
to hostile actions below this level of destructiveness.
To concentrate on such factors as common legal principles,
the economic relations between states, or the fear generated by
new weapons avoids the principal issue facing a world rule of
law. This issue, however trite its restatement may be, remains the
fundamental political division of the world. The task to be faced
is the reduction of conflicts and tensions generated by opposing
national interests. Identical legal principles and procedures
have served on both sides of international conflicts. "Transnational law" does not touch the substance of the differences between states but rather social and economic relations have increasingly become the function of political policy. And last, but
not least, fear not only deters action but provokes irrational
action. In any case, the fear generated by nuclear weapons does
not in itself provide a basis for a more unified world order. In
his call for a rethinking of the role of law in international relations, the author urges a fundamental transfer of man's loyalties from the nation to some higher authority. Whether or not
this can be accomplished by positive thinking as the author seems
to advocate is questionable. However amazing the results of this
approach may be, even positive thinking can be a liability when
it is misdirected.
One of the chief objectives of the world rule of law "movement" and the announced policy of the present administration
is the strengthening of the International Court of Justice. One
could consult no better study than Judge Lauterpacht's recently
revised edition of The Development of International Law by the
International Court to discover the limitations of this approach
to the problem of world peace. While the author views the history of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the
International Court of Justice as a steady growth in judicial
effectiveness, he minimizes the importance of the two courts as
instruments for the maintenance of peace. The chief value of
the Court lay in the fact of its availability to nations for the
settlement of disputes. "For what matters," the author states,
"is not the number of disputes actually decided by the court, but
the fact that a contemplated wrong was not proceeded with or
that controversies have been settled without its intervention in
conformity with justice for the reason in the absence of a satis-

1960]

BOOK REVIEWS

factory solution, one party was at liberty to bring the dispute
before the court." The limited use of the Court and the substance
of the contentious cases brought before it seems to belie even
this modest claim to its effectiveness. The fact is that the Court
has been by-passed on those issues that bear directly on peace.
It is inconceivable that the German question, the issue of the offshore islands, or the border dispute between India and China
could be settled by judication. Such issues involve political considerations which nations are still unwilling to leave to third
party judgment; that is, issues where an adverse decision is
unacceptable. The power contest between the United States and
the Soviet Union is one that involves the fundamental question
as to which legal system shall prevail. This question cannot be
settled by a court. The present state of international relations
will allow at best an uneasy coexistence of legal systems and, if
one accepts the revolutionary objectives of international communism, it will be a far from peaceful coexistence. If it is true,
as the author states, that the achievements of any court "is dependent upon the state of political integration of the society
whose law it administers," then the insistence on a greater reliance on the World Court as a part of American foreign policy
can lead to no greater results than litigations involving questions
that do not touch the core of the basic political conflicts or, if
carried beyond this point, holds out the danger of turning the
Court into a new propaganda battleground of the cold war.
Judge Lauterpacht is primarily concerned with the work of
the Court from a procedural standpoint. The key to the operation of the Court is summed up in the idea of "judicial caution."
"Judicial caution" is defined as "an attitude of mind resulting,
in addition to the ordinary counsels of prudence, from the fact
that the courts have to apply the law in force." The degree of
uncertainty as to what the law is in international law makes
"judicial caution" by far the dominant attitude of the Court.
The phrases "judicial caution," "judicial restraint," "judicial
hesitation," and "the appearance of judicial indecision" employed
by the author sum up rather well the Court's "judicial effectiveness" as well as its procedural pace. The procedure of the Court
depends essentially upon diplomatic agreement. In an overwhelming majority of cases there must be agreement between
the parties of a dispute to accept the jurisdiction of the Court
and agreement in the execution of the Court's decision. Thus
the World Court does not decide in the sense of a domestic court
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but is forced into the role of a moderator. While this is neither
an undesirable nor meaningless role, it falls short of providing
a basis for the expectation that issues which fundamentally divide two states can be settled through the Court.
The vital question for a world rule of law remains one of the
degree of agreement over what these rules should be. The two
works under review here illustrate, whether intended or unintended, the areas where agreement is possible and also where
disagreement is inevitable. Both works are eminently worth the
attention of those concerned with international law. Those concerned with a "world rule of law," however, will find only slender
straws to which to cling.
David Lehman*
by Charles S. Elyneman. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959. Pp. xi, 232.

THE STUDY OF POLITICS,

The sub-title of this book is "The Present State of American
Political Science," a subject which of late has heavily engaged
the principal students of politics- the political scientists. In
fact, inquiry into what political science is doing seems to preoccupy so many members of the profession that one sometimes
wonders whether they have not abandoned the study of politics
for the study of one another.
The present volume is a by-product of an elaborate examination of the curriculum of the political science department at
Northwestern University, which was undertaken with the assistance of a munificent grant from the Carnegie Foundation. During a substantial part of the time that this study was being carried out Professor Hyneman, who is best known for his work in
the field of public administration and was at one time director of
the school of government at Louisiana State University, served
as chairman of the department at Northwestern. The self-evaluation attempted to penetrate to the core of the discipline in order
to build a program of studies on a sound epistemological basis.
Those who know Professor Hyneman and/or his works would
expect to find in a wide-open discussion of this type many examples of his characteristic forthrightness in tossing out chal*Research Assistant at the Center for the Study of American Foreign and
Military Policy and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University.

